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This article explicates the common ground between two
currently independent fields of inquiry, namely informa-
tion arts and information science, and suggests a frame-
work that could unite them as a single field of study. The
article defines and clarifies the meaning of information
art and presents an axiological framework that could be
used to judge the value of works of information art. The
axiological framework is applied to examples of works of
information art to demonstrate its use. The article argues
that both information arts and information science could
be studied under a common framework; namely, the
domain-analytic or sociocognitive approach. It also is
argued that the unification of the two fields could help
enhance the meaning and scope of both information
science and information arts and therefore be beneficial
to both fields.
Introduction
Information arts and information science are, at present,
two independent fields of practice which share a common
label. There is little, if any, communication between con-
cepts, methods, theories, and research interests of the two
fields. Information scientists generally are not aware of the
emerging field of information arts, and conversely, artists
who produce works of information art are not familiar with
the body of work developed in information science. This ar-
ticle aims to show that the two fields in fact share more than
a name and that knowledge produced in either field could
enhance and help develop the other. In fact, it is the objec-
tive of this article to demonstrate that the two fields could
be studied under a single framework or theoretical ap-
proach. In particular, it will be demonstrated that certain ap-
proaches that have been developed to analyze documents
and documentary retrieval systems in the recent years also
could be used to analyze works of information art. This, in
turn, has certain implications for the definition and scope of
information science, which also is addressed in the article.
In short, it is the argument of the article that unification of
information arts and science is possible and desirable for
both fields.
In the rest of the present section, the term information
arts is discussed and its various meanings identified. The
next section discusses the changing functions of art and roles
of artists, and presents an axiological framework that out-
lines how value of works of information art could be judged.
The use of the axiological framework is illustrated by a
number of real and fictitious works of art. It also is argued
that information science and information arts could be
united under a common framework; namely, the domain-
analytic approach put forward by Birger Hjørland and col-
leagues (Hjørland, 1992, 1997a; Hjørland & Albrechtsen,
1995). The penultimate section discusses further the paral-
lels between the two fields and argues that information
artists could be trained in similar ways to information scien-
tists. The final section presents the main conclusions that can
be drawn from the article.
Early Conceptual Information Arts
Whereas information science as a discipline has been es-
tablished for over a quarter of century, the term information
art has been used recently to refer to various new types of
works of art produced in a variety of different contexts. One
use of the term refers to the commercial art or craft of de-
signing interactive documents (e.g., Web pages) and, in gen-
eral, interactive systems as the curricula of one university
department suggests.1 This particular usage, which refers to
the craft of information and interaction design, is excluded
from the discussion here. Instead, the article deals with non-
utilitarian works of art that use information as their primary
medium of expression2 instead of the traditional media of
paint and charcoal or stone and bronze. To articulate the spe-
cific meaning of the term referred to in this article, it is nec-
essary to have a brief look at earlier examples of artworks
that combine art with science and technology.
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The earliest experiments with information technology in
arts involved computer-generated images. One of the pioneers
in this field was A. Michael Noll, who generated in 1960s im-
ages that look uncannily like Mondrian paintings with the help
of (by today’s standards) simple computer graphics technol-
ogy then available. There were other contemporaries such as
Charles Csuri, who was similarly producing primitive com-
puter-generated images that could be considered as first exam-
ples of computer-aided art (Gere, 2002). Early experiments in
computer graphics and related experiments in computer music
could be seen as attempts to explicitly use high technology in
the creation of art. There was, however, another kind of exper-
imental art produced in the 1960s and early 1970s, which did
not always use computers or other high-tech tools but was in-
spired or influenced by technological ideas and scientific
concepts of the period. Shanken (2002) referred to these
experiments as “art-and-technology:”
Art-and-technology has focused its inquiry on the materials
and/or concepts of technology and science, which it recog-
nizes artists have historically incorporated in their work. Its
investigations include: (1) the aesthetic examination of the
visual forms of science and technology, (2) the application
of science and technology in order to create visual forms and
(3) the use of scientific concepts and technological media
both to question their prescribed applications and to create
new aesthetic models. (p. 434)
The following are some examples from the period that
illustrates the aforementioned points. News and Visitor’s
Profile are two works created by the conceptual artist Hans
Haacke, which were shown in the Software, Information
Technology: Its New Meaning for Art exhibition curated by
art critic Jack Burnham, held in 1970 in New York. The first
work consisted of several Teletype machines that printed
out on continuous rolls of paper news about national and
international events in real time. Visitor’s Profile was a
computerized system that cross-tabulated demographic in-
formation about exhibition visitors with their opinions on a
variety of topics (Shanken, 2002). Both works were influ-
enced by Cybernetics and related technoscientific discourse
of the era. Contact: A Cybernetic Sculpture (1969) by Les
Levine involved video cameras that captured images of
viewers which were fed back with time delay and other
types of distortions to a number of monitors (Shanken,
2002). This work, like many others from the same period,
also was influenced by ideas from Cybernetics and interac-
tive information technology. Cybernetics, General Systems
Theory, and Information (Communication) Theory of Shan-
non and Weaver (1949) were indeed the dominant scientific
discourses of the 1950s and 1960s, and many artists of the
time explicitly or implicitly drew inspiration and ideas from
them (Gere, 2002). The curator of the Software exhibition,
Burnham, in a number of essays explicitly drew compar-
isons between computer software and ideas/concepts that
underlie art objects, which were in turn compared to hard-
ware (Shanken, 2002). Another work by Levine, System’s
Burn-Off X Residual Software (1969), which documented
“the media spectacle” was comprised of 1,000 copies of
31 photographs taken by Levine at the opening of the highly
publicized Earth Works (1969) exhibition in New York. The
work was exhibited in the Software exhibition. Although
Systems Burn-Off did not incorporate any high-tech equip-
ment, the ideas behind it drew from Cybernetics and infor-
mation technology. As Shanken (2002) explained:
System’s Burn-Off was an artwork that produced information
(software) about the information produced and disseminated
by the media (software) about art (hardware). It offered a cri-
tique of the systemic process through which art objects
(hardware) become transformed by the media into informa-
tion about art objects (software). (p. 434)
These experiments, which mixed art with scientific dis-
course and technology, should be understood in relation to
parallel developments in art in the 1960s. Conceptual art,
sometimes called “concept art” or “idea art,” was the leading
art movement of the era and left indelible marks on the art-
works created ever since. Its influence is still being felt
strongly in the contemporary art scene (Wood, 2002,
pp. 8–9). There were strong similarities between the ideas be-
hind the works of conceptual artists and those who were in-
volved in art-and-technology experiments of the 1960s
(Shanken, 2002). As noted earlier, Haacke, who was one of
the leading figures in art-and-technology experiments, also
was a prominent figure in the conceptual art movement. Con-
ceptual art was interested in analyzing the ideas underlying
the creation and reception of art. It de-emphasized the value
traditionally accorded to the materiality of art objects and
focused on examining the preconditions of how meaning
emerges in art, which is seen as a semiotic system (Shanken,
2002, p. 434). For this reason, it is seen as a movement that
merges art with philosophy (Alberro, 2003; Wood, 2002). In
the words of art critic and curator Burnham (1970/2000):
Beyond a fundamental re-evaluation of the meaning of art,
Conceptualism inadvertently asks, “What is the nature of
ideas? How are they disseminated and transformed? And
how do we free ourselves of the confusion between ideas
and their correlations with physical reality?” (p. 217)
In short, the dictum of Conceptual art was “art as idea.”
The art object is no longer materially but conceptually
defined. Art becomes a matter of opinion, and its importance
is located almost exclusively in its meaning (Alberro, 2003).
Conceptual artists eschewed use of traditional materials such
as paint or charcoal in their works. The key issue for them was
the separation of art (idea) from its material presentation and
the preferred media for conceptual art were usually language
and graphics. It is notable in this context that conceptual
artists and theorists talked about “primary information” (i.e.,
the essence of the piece, its ideational part) and “secondary
information” (i.e., the material information by which one be-
comes aware of the piece, the form of presentation).
In thecontextof thepreviousdiscussion,onepossiblemean-
ing of the term information art can be identified. Although the
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term information art was not used by conceptual artists or the
related group of artists engaged in art-and-technology experi-
ments discussed earlier, clearly such work emphasized the
“meaning” and “ideational content” of art over its physical
manifestation. Such work was therefore primarily not made for
looking at but for mentally engaging or informing the viewer.
Indeed, several pieces from the period contained or sometimes
entirely consisted of linguistic definitions, collection of facts
and statements, instructions to be followed by the viewer, and
images taken from mass media. One of the contemporary con-
ceptual artists, Malloy (as cited in Topping, 2000), stated that:
Information art is a kind of conceptual art that is based on
collections of information that convey some meaning as a
whole and are (usually) deliberately assembled by artists for
this purpose. It could be collections of statements—such as
Hans Haacke’s On Social Grease (1975) that is based on
(mostly corporate) remarks about art; or, images from the
mass media such as the collection Hal Fischer made in the
early 80’s of advertising from the Poppers industry or Peter
D’Agostino’s 1981 collections of telecommunications ads
Invading The Information Age. [formatting modified]
However, information content is not the only defining
characteristic of art-and-technology experiments and con-
ceptual artworks of the 1960s. There is another aspect of
them which is more relevant to the discussion of contempo-
rary works of information art discussed in the next section.
Both types of art were self-reflexive and meta-critical. Con-
ceptual art of the period challenged the limits and problema-
tized the meaning of art and the function of the artist. It
conceived artist as a social and political critic rather than as
a craftsman, and art as a process of interrogation of the struc-
tures of knowledge and systems of signification that made
“possible art to produce meaning in art’s multiple contexts,
including its history and criticism, exhibitions and markets”
(Shanken, 2002, p. 434). Similarly, art-and-technology
experiments were interested in the social and aesthetic im-
plications of technological media that define, package, and
distribute information and the systems of knowledge that
structure scientific methods and conventional aesthetic val-
ues (Shanken, 2002, p. 434). It is in this context that the type
of art exemplified earlier in this section should be seen as
predecessor to the new breed of high-tech or information
arts that are discussed in the next section. The defining char-
acteristic of the new breed of information arts is that such
works help answer or generate significant questions regard-
ing fundamental epistemological and ontological assump-
tions relevant to the scientific disciplines from which the
artwork derives its methods, concepts, or tools.3 In the
1960s, conceptual art and related experimentation with
technology were influenced by the dominant technoscien-
tific discourse of that period. The questions these artworks
raised were, in general, limited to Cybernetics and related
discourses of Systems Science and Information
(Communication) Theory. As it will be shown in the next
section, this has changed dramatically in the last decade, and
many more scientific disciplines have been referenced and
more complex questions raised.
New Conceptual Information Arts
Shortly after the Software exhibition in 1970, the cyber-
netic era was over—no major art gallery in Britain and the
United States exhibited such work for more than 30 years
(Gere, 2002). Conceptual art has continued to be a major
influence in the contemporary art scene right to the present
day, although few artists today explicitly identify them-
selves with the 1960s’ conceptual movement. Reasons for
the parting of ways between the art world and cybernetics-
influenced 1960s’ experimental art include (a) technical
failures in art-and-technology exhibitions, (b) skepticism
toward materiality and spectacle of mechanical appara-
tuses and modernist object, (c) skepticism toward the first-
order cybernetics’ military-industrial connections and con-
notations, and (d) the fact that many technological
innovations pioneered in such work have been progres-
sively integrated to off-the-shelf consumer products (Gere,
2002; Shanken, 2002). Some artists did continue to use
Cybernetic/Systems concepts throughout the 1970s and
1980s, but interest shifted from automation, control, and
feedback to body and the subjective human observer
which paralleled the developments in the second-order
cybernetics (Gere, 2002).
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the rela-
tionships between art, science, and technology. Stephen Wil-
son’s (2002) compendium entitled “Information Arts: Inter-
sections of Art, Science, and Technology” testifies this turn
in fortunes. The volume, which features over 1,000 artists in
some 900 pages, is a survey of works created mainly within
the last decade that integrate art with science and technol-
ogy. Although the works surveyed in this volume have clear
relationships to the type of art described in the preceding
section, there are major differences that need to be under-
lined. Body and subjectivity seem to continue to play an im-
portant part in many of the surveyed works of art; however,
there are many more diverse themes that these works of art
address. The most significant difference is that use of scien-
tific concepts and ideas is no longer limited to Cybernetics,
Systems Science, Information/Communication Theory, and
related discourses. Many other scientific disciplines directly
contributed to the works surveyed in this compendium. The
book is organized according to scientific fields referenced by
the surveyed works, which reveals the diversity of disci-
plines that contributed to the creation of works of art. The
following are the main divisions of the book. The surveyed
3It is questionable whether this kind of art should still be called “informa-
tion art” or, for instance, “knowledge art,” echoing the arguments that whether
“information science” is an accurate label to refer to the type of activities car-
ried under this name. Further discussion of this point will not be dealt with
until later in the article. It is worth noting here that the choice of the name is
fortune in that it signals a possible similarity of content between information
science and information arts, which is the main thesis of this article.
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artists and artworks are discussed under one or more of these
categories:
• Biology: Microbiology, Genetic Engineering; Animals and
Plants; Ecology; Medicine and Body.
• Physical Sciences: Physics; Chemistry; Geology; Geo-
graphic Positioning Systems; Astronomy; Space Science;
Atomic Physics; Nuclear Science; Nanotechnology; Nonlin-
ear Systems.
• Algorithms and Mathematics: Algorithmic Art; Artificial
Life; Fractals; Genetic, Evolutionary and Organic Art.
• Kinetics, Sound Installations, and Robots: Robotics and
Kinetics; Kinetic Instruments; Sound Sculpture and Indus-
trial Music.
• Telecommunications: Telephone; Radio; Net.Radio; Tele-
conferencing; Videoconferencing; Satellites; the Internet;
Telepresence; Web Art.
• Digital Information SystemsComputers: Interactive Media;
Virtual Reality; Motion, Touch, Gaze Sensors; Artificial
Intelligence; 3-D Sound; Speech Synthesis; Scientific Visu-
alization; Information and Surveillance.
The main thesis of Stephen Wilson’s (2002) Information
Arts is that the meaning and character of science- and tech-
nology-oriented art have been dramatically changing since
the beginning of the 1990s. The artists who have experi-
mented with science and technology in recent years do not
see art as a practice of creating merely aesthetic objects or
social commentary, according to Wilson (2002). Instead, art
has become a kind of research.
Art as Research
As discussed in the preceding section, early conceptual
art and art-and-technology experiments can be considered
works of information art in a particular sense: They carry
messages that express ideas and opinions. In some cases, the
works specifically consisted of information collected and as-
sembled from various sources that comment or inform on
various social and cultural issues. As Deleuze and Guattari
(1994) stated, in conceptual art: “. . . the plan of composition
tends to become ‘informative’ and the sensation depends
upon the simple ‘opinion’ of spectator who determines
whether or not to ‘materialize’ the sensation, that is to say,
decides whether or not it is art” (p. 198). A special interest
was paid to the use of language and, more generally, signs in
conveying messages/information and the complicated rela-
tionships between art and new information and telecommu-
nications technologies that are used in the production and
dissemination of artworks.
Wilson (2002) used the label “Information Arts” in his
aforementioned book in a broader sense, however. Wilson’s
(2002) Information Arts charts the changing role of the artist
and the character of artworks that have been created within
the last decade. Art, science, and technology always have
had close relationships, but the relationship of art to science
and technology is rapidly changing in an era dominated
by technological and scientific research, and the artists are
responding to these changes by becoming a new kind of re-
searcher, according to Wilson (2002). Artists are developing
various strategies in response to changes in the social and
cultural domains. As Wilson (2004a) stated:
Many artists are becoming active in research areas but the
approaches they take vary widely. One response positions
artists as consumers of the new tools, using them to create
new images, sounds, video, and events; another response
sees artists emphasizing the critical functions of art to com-
ment on the developments from the distance; a final
approach urges artists to enter into the heart of research as
core participants, developing their own research agendas
and undertaking their own investigations.
The character of this new kind of research is discussed in
detail in the next section. It is suffice to reiterate here the sim-
ilarities between art-and-technology experiments and concep-
tual art of 1960s and the new types of works of art described
in Wilson’s (2002) book. Both kinds of art are interested in in-
terrogating the social structures and systems of knowledge
and signification that shape conventional aesthetic values as
well as scientific methods. It is in this context that early con-
ceptual information art and the new breed of high-tech art sur-
veyed in Wilson’s book and discussed next are related. More
specifically, it is one of the main theses of this article that con-
ceptual information arts have moved from its beginnings as
experiments that challenged the limits and meaning of art and
cybernetics-related discourses in the 1960s to a highly sophis-
ticated research-like work that produces new knowledge rele-
vant to many diverse scientific disciplines by answering or
generating significant epistemological and ontological ques-
tions or creating new knowledge, tools and procedures. There
are many documented examples of such work, a few of which
are discussed in the next section.4
From Ideas to Knowledge Production (Research)
The new breed of artists contributes to science in a variety
of ways. The works of art they produce may require invention
of new tools or devices, which might be useful for scientific
research as well. The work of art itself may inspire scientists
to see in a new light or think differently about fundamental
principles or methods in their fields.Alternatively, the work of
art may be a direct source of information or knowledge5 that
enhances scientific thinking and research. Wilson (2004a)
elaborated on the ways artists could contribute to science:
Artists might assign different priorities to various research
agendas.
Artists might ask different research questions.
Artists might help deconstruct unacknowledged assump-
tions in the frameworks that guide research.
4The examples are mainly from Wilson, as he is one of the few
researchers/artists working in this emerging field who provides detailed
accounts of works of information art. Other detailed accounts can be found
in Ede (2005) and in Arends and Thackara (2003).
5It will not be attempted to differentiate between these terms until the
Information Science and Art section later in this article (also see Footnote 3).
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Artists might challenge standard research procedures or
invent new ones.
Artists might discover new knowledge or invent new
technologies.
Artists might interpret results differently.
Artists might invent new ways to extract understanding via
information visualization.
Artists might identify cultural implications of research
results missed by other researchers.
One current area of intense artistic activity is bioarts.
Three examples from bioarts6 and another example related to
information retrieval (IR) are discussed in this section to
illustrate some of the possible ways of integrating art and sci-
ence. The first work that will be discussed is an example of
how artists could help invent new tools. Paul Vanouse is an
artist whose work relates to genetics. His work Relative
Velocity Inscription Device (2002) is mainly a social com-
mentary on race, gender, and related issues. For this work,
Vanouse extracted DNA samples from members of different
racial groups and subjected them to electrophoresis (Wilson,
2004a). Electrophoresis is a method used in molecular biol-
ogy to separate proteins, nucleic acids, and other subcellular
particles. It is based on the principle that biological samples
subjected to electrostatic field separate and migrate at differ-
ent rates depending on their surface net charge density (Tietz,
2005). Vanouse in this work created a metaphoric athletics
spectacle in which DNA samples from different racial groups
are watched to compete. The work required a larger and
quicker than standard electrophoresis equipment. This techni-
cal requirement forced the artist to design and construct a new
type of electrophoresis device. The artist thus functioned as
technological innovator and invented a device that may one
day prove to be useful in scientific research (Wilson, 2004a).
The second example shows how bioarts research could con-
tribute to radical new ways of thinking in science. In his 1990
work Microvenus, Joe Davis digitized and translated into a
string of 28 DNAnucleotides a figure based on Germanic rune
representing the female Earth. The genetically engineered
DNAsequences that carry the graphical message were then in-
serted into the genomes of living E. coli bacteria. Davis called
this work an “infogene.” Fifteen years ago, Davis’s idea of
using DNAto encode extrabiological information, not just ge-
netic sequences, was novel and did not have many precedents.
Today, computer scientists and genetic engineers are working
on DNA computing techniques and biological computers that
could revolutionize computer science in the not-too-distant fu-
ture (Gibbs, 2001; Wilson 2004a). We do not know whether
any of the pioneers of the DNAcomputing had any familiarity
with Davis’s work, and if they had, whether they drew any
inspiration or knowledge from it; however, it is plausible to
imagine that any scientist with relevant background and
preparedness could have been inspired by this work if he or she
had come in contact with it. Although the artistic motivation
behind it is most certainly different, the importance of this
work is that it has the potential to inform or inspire those with
relevant background and preparedness to think radically about
fundamentals of computer science. Therefore, it illustrates
how artistic creativity could be a source of potential inspiration
and perhaps knowledge, and could have significant conse-
quences for scientific research.
The third work is again from bioarts. SymbioticA is a
research laboratory dedicated to the artistic exploration of
scientific knowledge and biological technologies within the
School of Anatomy & Human Biology at the University of
Western Australia. The Web site for the lab7 states that:
SymbioticA is the first research laboratory of its kind, in that
it enables artists to engage in wet biology practices in a bio-
logical science department. Developments in science and
technology, in particular in the life sciences, are having a
profound effect on society, its values, belief systems and
treatment of individuals, groups and the environment. The
interaction of art, science, industry and society is recognized
internationally as an essential avenue for innovation and
invention, and as a way to explore, envision and critique
possible futures. Science and Art both attempt to explain the
world around us in ways that are profoundly different but
which can be complementary to each other.
Artists can act as important catalysts for creative and
innovative processes and outcomes. They also can critically
examine the various assumptions, and sometimes self-
delusions, built in to the “scientific method.” There is a need
for artists and other nonscientists to actively participate in re-
search into possible and contestable futures arising from the
application of newly acquired knowledge. While nonscien-
tifically trained artists may have a limited ability to analyze
the detailed veracity of scientific work, “outsiders” working
in a different mental framework can bring both insights and
distractions into the debates about the mechanisms, ethics,
and philosophy behind scientific work. This can be effective
only if those same artists engage actively in the science and
the debate so that they have enough understanding of the
process and work to engage meaningfully with it.
SymbioticA sets out to provide a situation where this can
happen, an opportunity in which interdisciplinary research
and other knowledge and concept-generating activities can
take place. It provides an opportunity for researchers to
pursue curiosity-based explorations free of the demands and
constraints associated with the current culture of scientific
research. SymbioticA also offers a new means of artistic
inquiry, one in which artists actively use the tools and tech-
nologies of science not just to comment about them but also
to explore their possibilities.
One of the SymbioticAprojects is called “Bioreactor.”8 The
aim of the project is to create “semiliving sculptures/ objects”
from living tissues that can be grown, sustained, and displayed
6There are many examples from several other disciplines that can be
discussed here. The reason for concentrating on examples from bioarts is
that they are generally more interesting and challenging and less known.
7http://www.symbiotica.uwa.edu.au/info/info.html
8http://www.symbiotica.uwa.edu.au/research/bioreactor.html
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—November 2006 1785
DOI: 10.1002/asi
in nonspecialized environments (e.g., museums). The work
requires the SymbioticA team to tackle complex scientific
challenges addressed only by researchers working at the cut-
ting edge of biosciences. As Wilson (2004a) explained:
For example, they had to figure out ways to provide nourish-
ment to growing cells and new ways of providing lattices to
guide growth in the patterns they wanted. These investiga-
tions are another example of artists undertaking work that
typically would be conducted by engineers or scientists in
more conventional settings. The artistic agenda demanded
they develop unorthodox skills and understandings neces-
sary to complete the work. In doing so, they potentially add
to the knowledge in this emerging field similarly to the way
other researchers might.
The last example is a work by Stephen Wilson and con-
cerns IR. In Traces of Culture (Wilson, 2004b, 2005), which
was exhibited at the ACM Multimedia conference in 2004,
users are invited to participate in a number of “events” orga-
nized around the theme of Web search engines and multime-
dia retrieval. It exists both as a gallery installation and as a
Web site. In one of the events, called “Search Matrix,” users
are presented with lists of query terms from a variety of
search engines on the Web. Clicking on a word brings up
thumbnail-size images retrieved by it, which are animated
and displayed in a variety of forms on the screen, creating a
“collage.” In another event, the user can view the past search
terms submitted to the system by other users through the
Web site and images retrieved by them. In “Cinema of Fa-
mous Texts,” the user is presented with images that represent
books by famous authors. Clicking on one of the images dis-
plays the text of the book in a scrolling line. Clicking on one
of the animated words from the book displays images asso-
ciated with it. Traces of Culture probes into the search
process and investigates questions of meaning, ambiguity,
and element of surprise that underlie it in humorous and
visually interesting ways. In Wilson’s (2005) words:
Traces of Culture presents a series of real time interactive art
events that investigate [the] search process and the underly-
ing compendium. It reflects on:
• The nature of search (sometimes yielding what was
expected and sometimes presenting surprises—either
less or more than was anticipated)
• The relationship between words and images
• The richness and diversity of the world’s images stored
on the Web
• Our assumptions about what is on the Web and how it can
be accessed
As the previous examples described, this work provides a
rich, artistic environment that could inspire and help tap into
intuitive, preverbal, creative thought processes. In the next
section, the ways in which artistic research could contribute
to scientific knowledge are discussed in the context of eval-
uation of new forms of hybrid art–science–technology
experiments, called information arts.
Work of Art as Research Document
Arguably, the art world is in crisis. Ivan Massow, then
chairman of the Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA), the
premier platform for contemporary arts in Britain, reportedly
remarked in 2002 that most concept art is “pretentious, self-
indulgent, craftless tat” (Gibbons, 2002). In fact “the end of
art” has been proclaimed by several critics/theorists in the
last decades for different reasons (Doorman, 2003). One
such critic is philosopher Arthur Danto, who in After the End
of Art (1997) stated that:
To say that history is over is to say that there is no longer a
pale of history for works of art to fall outside of. Everything
is possible. Anything can be art. And, because the present
situation is essentially unstructured, one can no longer fit a
master narrative to it [emphasis added]. (p. 114)
This fact is well known to the conceptual artists of the
1960s. Indeed, one of the pioneers of the 1960s’ conceptual
art movement, Joseph Kosuth (1969/2000), wrote (quoting
Donald Judd, another pioneer from the same period): “If
someone calls it art it’s art” (p. 163). The apparent lack of
rules is arguably at the root of the crisis in contemporary art
echoed by the former chairman of the ICA. How to evaluate
modern art, thus, has become problematic. In this and the
following section, an approach to evaluation of new forms of
high-tech art is presented, which is hoped to provide us with
a more “objective” framework for the assessment of the
value of certain kinds of works of art. Furthermore, this ap-
proach will help us relate the emerging field of information
arts to information science in the Information Science and
Art section later in this article.
To arrive at an evaluation framework for the new forms
of art and science experiments, we first look at how an infor-
mation artist does research in more detail. Wilson (1995), in
Artificial Intelligence as Research, describes the learning
process he went through to become familiar with the impor-
tant research issues in Artificial Intelligence (AI):
I undertook to learn what I could about the research agendas,
accomplishments, and unresolved problems of the field. I
read extensively, took courses, dived into LISP,9 attended
meetings, and corresponded with researchers. I identified
areas of research that seemed undeveloped and entertained
questions derived from this contact with the field. I produced
art installations that focused on issues in artificial intelli-
gence research.
Wilson (1995), then, exemplified some of the dominant
AI assumptions he had questioned from the perspective of
an artist concerned with nontechnical, cultural, and aesthetic
aspects of AI programs and systems:
Some discourse about AI seems to imply that intelligence
can be viewed as an abstract, disembodied process. This
view assumes that there is a “correct” way for the processes
9A functional programming language favored by artificial intelligence
researchers.
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of natural language understanding, planning, problem
solving, or vision to function and that there are “raw” mean-
ings that programs can understand and manipulate. In this
view, understanding and problem solving are technical
accomplishments that can be assessed objectively.
In interactions with AI programs, technical correctness in re-
sponse is often viewed as the only criterion to evaluate inter-
action. Correctness means that the human interactor judges
that the program’s response indicates that it understood the
gist of the human’s communication. Except in extremely
circumscribed contexts, this restricted interaction may be
unacceptable: humans crave texture in interactions with in-
telligent entities that go beyond technical correctness—for
example, personality, mood, purposiveness, sensitivity, falli-
bility, humor, style, emotion, self-awareness, growth, and
moral and aesthetic values. Disaffection with limited inter-
actions will become more severe as AI applications
spread. . . . AI researchers who believe they are objectively
avoiding these issues may be deluding themselves. Simi-
larly, those who believe they are only following the classic
scientific strategy of defining manageable research problems
are underestimating the nature of what is being defined
away.
This detailed account of an information artist’s research
into AI exemplifies the type of contribution that could be
expected from artists working with technology, concepts,
and methods/techniques borrowed from science today.
Comparison of the examples of works of art given in the
Early Conceptual Information Arts section with those dis-
cussed in the From Ideas to Knowledge Production (Re-
search) section and the present section makes it possible to
substantiate the main claim of the article so far: Conceptual
art of the 1960s that dealt mainly with (simple) ideas mu-
tated into a complex activity that deals with important re-
search questions. In other words, “idea art” of the 1960s
transformed into a sophisticated from of “information art”
in the 1990s, which takes part in knowledge production in
various ways. In this transformation, a shift from work of
art as representation of ideas or opinions to work of art as
representation of fully worked-out research problems can
be observed. This is a shift from “art as concept” to “art as
fully developed research document.” It could therefore be
concluded that whereas earlier conceptual works of art in-
formed the spectator about the ideas and opinions of their
creators, the contemporary works of information art inform
about problems pertinent to scientific and technological
issues. A work of art has become, in this new period, a
document that communicates technological and scientific
information.10
Therefore, the purpose or function of a work of informa-
tion art can be formulated as: 
The purpose or function of a work of information art is to
facilitate communication of pertinent scientific and techno-
logical information.11
In a more open form:
Information art helps generate or answer significant ques-
tions regarding fundamental epistemological and ontologi-
cal assumptions relevant to the scientific discipline(s) from
which the work derives its methods, concepts, or tools.
This definition enables us to make the following state-
ment regarding the value of a work of information art:
(V) Value of a work of information art is related to its
potential to inform or address pertinent research questions/
problems.
This statement echoes directly the approach proposed by
Hjørland (1992) to subject analysis of (scientific) docu-
ments, and will enable us to relate information arts to infor-
mation science in the Information Science and Art section
later in this article.
Axiology
Axiology is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature
of values and value judgments, including those of both aes-
thetics and ethics (Kemerling, 2002). It is derived from
“axios” (of like value, worthy) and “logos” (account, reason,
theory) (Runes, 1942). Based on the earlier statement (V) re-
garding the value of art, Figure 1 suggests that there are dif-
ferent levels at which the value of a work of art could be
evaluated. At a more superficial or pragmatic level, a work of
art might pose question(s) or inspire new ideas that are valid
in a field of inquiry regardless of various different ap-
proaches, frameworks, schools of thought, or paradigms that
may exist in that field; however, it is well known that in any
scientific discipline, or more generally, disciplined inquiry,
there are many different research agendas and approaches to
the object of study that determine the types of questions
asked and prescribe ways of going about answering those
questions. Research is conducted within a theoretical and
methodological framework, which “determines what ques-
tions are legitimate, how answers may be obtained, what are
counted as facts and what significance is attached to these
facts” (Burgess-Limerick, Abernethy, & Limerick, 1994,
p. 139). Thus, philosophers and sociologists of science talk
about “paradigms” in a given field of study. The concept of
paradigm is usually associated with Kuhn’s work on the
progress in science (as cited in Skrtic, 1990). Kuhn’s (1962)
use of the term is neither consistent nor clear (Ellis, 1992;
Skrtic, 1990). Later, Masterman (1970) identified 21 senses
11This formulation is akin to the definition of the function of art given by
Iseminger (2004) from a perspective known as aestheticism: “The function
of the artworld and practice of art is to promote aesthetic communication”
(p. 23). The discussion of the similarities and differences between the two
definitions, however, is beyond the scope of the present article.
10It could be argued that art always involves research, and documenting
it is important to many forms of art, especially to conceptually oriented art;
however, in the new kind of art described here, research undertaken is usu-
ally deeper, more technical and systematic, involves going through a learn-
ing process similar to scientific training, and more often than not, its content
comprises specifically scientific material. Perhaps we could simply say that
the new type of art discussed here practices a more disciplined inquiry, in
the sense used by Guba (1990), compared to other types of art.
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of the term, which could be categorized under three main
headings (Ellis, 1992, p. 46): (a) metaphysical paradigms,
(b) sociological paradigms, and (c) artifact or construct
paradigms.
Of the three categories, the metaphysical or meta-theoret-
ical paradigm is more fundamental12 in the sense that it de-
termines the sociological and the artifact/construct para-
digms (Skrtic, 1990). The metaphysical or meta-theoretical
paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus or a total world
view (Weltanschauung) in a given science. The sociological
paradigm is a concrete set of habits or a universally accepted
scientific achievement. Artifact paradigms refer to specific
tools, instruments, and procedures of collecting data (Skrtic,
1990). Ellis, on the other hand, suggested that the artifact
paradigm is defined by exemplary past achievements or ex-
emplars that provide “a way of seeing a problem as being
like another” (Ellis, 1992, p. 48). It seems that there is an
overlap between the definitions of the sociological and arti-
fact paradigms given by Skrtic and Ellis; however, for our
purpose, it is sufficient here to distinguish between a set of
philosophical assumptions that underpin research ap-
proaches or theories in a field of inquiry. In this article, the
term “paradigm” is used to refer to particular approaches or
theories in scientific research, or more generally, other types
of disciplined inquiry, underpinned by a set of metaphysical
assumptions. The latter is characterized in terms of the fol-
lowing three types of basic questions (Guba, 1990):
• Ontological: What is the nature of the “knowable?” Or, what
is the nature of “reality?”
• Epistemological: What is the nature of the relationship be-
tween the knower (the inquirer) and the known (or knowable)?
• Methodological: How should the inquirer go about finding
out knowledge? (p. 18)
Lincoln (1990) identified three competing contemporary
paradigms (or meta-theories13) in social sciences: Postposi-
tivist, Critical Theory, and Constructivist. The underpinning
metaphysical assumptions of these are summarized in Table 1,
taken from Lincoln (p. 78).
Ellis (1992) identified two major paradigms in IR re-
search: physical or archetypal and cognitive. The archetypal
paradigm has origins in the Cranfield tests, which established
the principle that relative merits of retrieval systems had to be
empirically determined. This approach focuses on the sys-
tems, algorithm, and representations of knowledge recorded
in physical media (Ellis, 1992), and can be seen as a case of
empiricism with a strong objectivist bent. Cognitive para-
digm, on the other hand, was developed in the 1970s and
1980s in reaction to the archetypal paradigm. It assumes all
information processing is mediated by a system of categories
of concepts which are a model of the world (Ellis, 1992). This
paradigm focuses on the individual user and his or her
mental models, knowledge-structures, and can be considered
as a case of rationalism with a strong subjective idealist
bent (methodological individualism) (Hjørland, 1997b).
Hjørland’s (1992, 1997a; Hjørland &Albrechtsen, 1995) work
represents a more recent approach to information seeking
and subject analysis in information science. This approach
is sometimes called sociocognitive (Hjørland, 2002) and
focuses on discourse communities, disciplines, division of
labor in society, and institutional practices. Cognitive struc-
tures in this approach are seen as social and historical rather
than as individual. This paradigm is related to the activity the-
ory of Vygotsky (1978) in psychology and more generally to
social-constructivist meta-theory and critical realism.
It is possible to find studies that explicate philosophical
bases of theories in other disciplines as well. King and
FIG. 1. The axiological framework for information arts.
13These are meta-theories rather than theories in the sense that they are
general, higher order, or fundamental “big” theories which underlie the ap-
proach of a whole scientific tradition and are not empirically testable. Ex-
amples in social sciences include utilitarian theory, Marxism, behaviorist
psychology, symbolic interactionism, Durkheimian sociology, Weberian so-
ciology, and structural functionalism. Meta-theories can generate (specific)
theories that are potentially testable (Roberts, 1999).
12Ellis (1992, pp. 46–47), on the other hand, stated that according to
Masterman artefact or construct paradigm is more fundamental in the sense
that it precedes the other two kinds of paradigms. From our perspective, it
is not important which paradigm precedes the others, but once a set of meta-
theoretical (metaphysical) assumptions are established in a field of inquiry,
it tends to determine the type of questions asked and how research is con-
ducted in that field.
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TABLE 1. Contrasts between the Postpositivist, Critical Theory, and Constructivist Paradigms.
Paradigm
Question Postpositivist Critical theory Constructivist
Ontology Realist Realist Relativist
Epistemology Dualist, objectivist Interactive, subjectivist Interactive, subjectivist
Methodology Interventionist Participative Hermeneutic, dialectic
Kimble (2004) identified philosophical underpinnings of
various approaches to software engineering. Table 2 summa-
rizes their findings. Burgess-Limerick et al. (1994), in a sim-
ilar vein, analyzed the philosophical bases of representa-
tional and nonrepresentational approaches to understanding
the control of movement in experimental psychology.
Although the accuracy and validity of the analyses of philo-
sophical underpinnings of theoretical approaches from dif-
ferent disciplines cited earlier are debatable, it is hoped that
they illustrate the claim that all research is conducted within
a theoretical and methodological framework underpinned by
usually implicit assumptions about the nature of reality and
ways of accessing it.
Statement (V) about the value of works of art and Figure 1
should, therefore, be read in terms of the earlier discussion
about the paradigms and philosophical assumptions that un-
derlie them. Based on the aforementioned arguments, it could
be expected that a work of art could be relevant to a field of
disciplined inquiry (or a number of them) in general (regard-
less of various paradigms that may exist), or to a particular
paradigm (or paradigms) in a discipline, or at a deeper level
to particular epistemological, ontological, and methodologi-
cal assumptions that underlie one or more paradigms or
theories. In the next section, this idea is applied schematically
to a fictitious work of information art for the purpose of
illustration.
Evaluation of a Fictitious Work of Information Art
It is impossible within the scope of this article to do an ex-
tensive analysis of a real work of art in terms of the axiologi-
cal framework proposed in the previous section. Here, only a
schematic analysis of a fictive work of art will be presented
for the sake of illustration of the previously mentioned ideas.
However, given the extensive discussions earlier about the
comparability of works of information art to research docu-
ments, it is plausible to expect that works of art can be
analyzed in similar ways that documents are analyzed by
information scientists working within the domain-analytic or
sociocognitive framework. For instance, Hjørland (2002) an-
alyzed subjects of documents in terms of the epistemological
positions of various theories in psychology. Given the feasi-
bility of such an analysis for scientific documents and the
analogy between documents and works of information art, it
is reasonable to expect that a similar analysis also could be
conducted for real works of art.
The fictitious example that will be used as illustration is
as follows: Let us assume that there is an immersive 3D in-
teractive art installation, which represents a library where
users (i.e., viewers) manipulate the books and other items on
the shelves directly by hand movements without the use of a
“mouse” or other traditional input devices such as a key-
board. This is possible with the currently available computer
vision techniques. It is conceivable that this installation
could inspire a researcher working in the field of digital li-
braries to imagine alternative interface designs. Although in-
terface design for retrieval systems is a valid problem for in-
formation scientists, arguably it is not a core research area in
information science. The idea of an immersive interface
whereby users interact with documents with hand move-
ments and gestures could be a useful idea for IR researchers
regardless of any particular research paradigm within which
they work. Thus, in terms of Figure 1, it could be said that
this work of art is relevant to or has a value at the level of
“Surface Research Questions” in information science.
Let us now imagine that the installation is such that
queries of previous visitors (i.e., users) are recorded and vi-
sually represented as floating clouds in a 3D virtual library,
which persist after the owners of the queries left the installa-
tion, and newcomers could see and manipulate them. We
could imagine that an IR researcher, working from within a
socially informed perspective, could be inspired by it and for-
mulate the idea that collaboration between past and present
users of IR systems could be possible and desirable. In terms
TABLE 2. Philosophical positions of software engineering methodologies.
Epistemological Ontological 
Research strand position position Example methodologies
Formal Rationalist Realist Unity, Z, VDM
Semiformal Rationalist Anti-Realist Jackson System Development
Object-oriented Empiricist Realist Booch Object Oriented Design
Holistic Empiricist Anti-Realist Soft Systems, Multiview
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of the axiological framework discussed earlier, this is a work
of art relevant to socially oriented paradigm(s) in IR, such as
the sociocognitive view mentioned in the previous section.
Let us now imagine that we traveled back in time
30 years or so, when the only established paradigms were
the archetypal and cognitive discussed earlier. Imagine that
socially informed theories did not exit at that time. It is plau-
sible, then, to argue that the same interactive art described
earlier could stimulate an IR researcher working within
either the archetypal or, more likely, the cognitive paradigm
to challenge the basic philosophical assumptions of that par-
ticular paradigm, for example, those related to methodologi-
cal individualism. Thus, in terms of Figure 1, this is a work
of the highest value, pertinent to deeper research questions
in IR. Microvenus by Davis described earlier could be con-
sidered as this kind of work for computer science.
Note that it is not claimed that a work of art could easily
be mapped exclusively to one of the levels of the axiological
framework illustrated by Figure 1. It is more realistic to think
in terms of degrees in which a work of art may be relevant to
one or more of the three categories of Figure 1. Additionally,
in the first example, what is considered not to be a core re-
search question in information science, namely interface de-
sign, is a core subject in human–computer interaction, an in-
terdisciplinary field. Therefore, a work of art that is only
tangentially or superficially relevant to one discipline could
be strongly relevant to another. Another note of caution is that
relevance of a work of art (or a document for that matter)
ultimately could be determined by researchers in a field, as its
epistemological potentials are not given a priori but devel-
oped by research in that and other fields (Karamuftuoglu,
1998). The task of axiological analysis as proposed here is
not simply to pass a judgment on the value of works but to
uncover the often implicit assumptions that underpin them,
which is in line with the approach to subject analysis pro-
posed by Hjørland (1992, 1997a, 2002). It also is not claimed
that aesthetic value of a work of art is determined exclusively
or mainly by its conceptual or cognitive content. Formal and
other qualities are often as important, but discussion of such
aspects of art is outside the scope of the present article.
Finally, as noted earlier, the examples used here are not based
on a real work of art, and therefore are contrived. It is left to
another study to demonstrate that the ideas outlined here
could be fruitfully applied to real works of art.
Information Science and Art
To establish the relationship between information science
and information art, it will be attempted to answer the fol-
lowing questions: What do information scientists and infor-
mation artists do and how do they do it? Information artists,
like other artists, create knowledge, albeit often not discur-
sive and certainly not scientific in a narrow sense. This state-
ment might strike as odd, as many believe that art imitates or
at best represents reality. However, Doorman (2003) in a
section of his book Art as Cognition, argued that conceptual
content is an important part of all (even mimetic or repre-
sentational) art, and art develops analogously to knowledge,
not only reflecting but also creating it. Furthermore, this is a
characteristic of all art: “There appears to be a similar cogni-
tive content in different art forms—in the form of the refine-
ment of perception, an increasing reflection and abstraction,
a relativizing of cognitive categorical schemes and so on”
(Doorman 2003, p. 137). Based on Goodman’s (1969) epis-
temological symbol theory, Doorman argued that art does
more than simply depicting or representing reality; it classi-
fies and symbolizes it:
. . . by the delicacy of its discriminations and the aptness of
its allusions; by the way it works in grasping, exploring, and
informing the world; by how it analyzes, sorts, orders, and
organizes; by how it participates in the making, manipula-
tion, retention, and transformation of knowledge. (p. 140)
Obviously, cognitive content of art is based on social codes
and conventions, traditions, knowledge, and discourse about
the world, but at the same time creates something new and
“sheds a different light on the world and contributes to knowl-
edge of reality” (Doorman, 2003, p. 138). Art brings together
the intellectual, sensual, and emotional to create a unique pro-
fusion of cognitive activities (Doorman, 2003, p. 140); but
how is its intellectual content exactly different from that of
science and philosophy? According to philosophers Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1994):
. . . from sentences or their equivalent, philosophy extracts
concepts (which should not be confused with general or ab-
stract ideas), whereas science extracts prospects (proposi-
tions that must not be confused with judgements), and art ex-
tracts percepts and affects (which must not be confused with
perceptions and feelings).14 (p. 24)
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1994, p. 66), “art
thinks not less than philosophy but it thinks through affects
and percepts,” instead of concepts as philosophy does. Art for
them, therefore, is a “. . . block of sensations, that is to say, a
compound of percepts and affects” (Deleuze & Guattari,
1994, p. 164). The purpose of art, for Deleuze and Guattari
(1994), is to make the imperceptible visible or perceptible:
. . . as music may be said to make sonorous force of time au-
dible, in Messiaen for example, or literature, with Proust, to
make the illegible force of time legible and conceivable. Is
this not the definition of the percept itself—to make percep-
tible the imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect
us, and make us become? Mondrian achieves this by simple
differences between the sides of a square, Kandinsky by lin-
ear “tensions”, and Kupka by planes curved around the
point. [formatting modified] (p. 182)
14In the sense that they are independent of the individual creator of the
work of art or the one who experiences it, as Deleuze and Guattari (1994)
argued in their book. Also note that for Deleuze and Guattari, philosophical
concept is different from concept understood as general or abstract idea.
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In information art, as defined and discussed in this arti-
cle, the artist makes visible or perceptible the knowledge
that science produces about the world (reality) by extracting
from it, and presenting in new ways percepts and affects
(sensations) that both reflect and contribute to the knowl-
edge about the world. The creation of blocks of sensations
or percepts and affects from knowledge about reality and
making them visible is a transformative and creative
process that generates new knowledge. Extraction of sensa-
tions is a process of decontextualization. The philosophical
term for decontextualization in Deleuze and Guattari (1994)
is deterritorialization. Art in Deleuze and Guattari’s philos-
ophy is an act of deterritorialization followed by an act of
reterritorialization (recontextualization): “The aim of the art
is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and the
states of a perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affec-
tions . . . to extract a block of sensations . . .” (p. 167). Per-
ception of the object (i.e., the world) requires knowledge
of it. We could say that without knowledge, there is no
perception.15
It is in the aforementioned sense that the artist extracts
sensations from the knowledge about the world. He or she
frees (or deterritorializes) perception from the knowledge of
the object and constructs a work of art, which is no other
than blocks of percepts and affects that lead to a new per-
ception, and therefore, knowledge about the world. In other
words, the artist first decontextualizes knowledge and then
recontextualizes it in a new way. Thus, art does not produce
knowledge about the world directly but it organizes and
transforms our knowledge of the world by making percepti-
ble16 what is only known abstractly, in the process trans-
forming our perception and understanding of the world,
which is then picked up by scientists and others and fed back
to the process of knowledge production. In the case of con-
ceptually oriented art (including information arts), the mate-
rial aspect of the work, as we have seen earlier, is often sec-
ondary to the idea (or concept) behind it. Nevertheless, the
idea is organized and made visible, and thus made accessi-
ble, to a large extent by the perceptions and affections it gen-
erates on the viewer or user. Failing to do so, it remains as an
abstract idea which is not fully realized and comprehended.
Artists do not acquire knowledge about the external real-
ity to provide a systematic account of cause and effect rela-
tionships between physical bodies or allow us to develop in-
terventions to control and manipulate variables extracted
from nature like scientists. They acquire knowledge about the
world to reorganize it. In other words, artists usually do not
directly work with the physical reality (Popper’s World 1)17
like scientists but work and create in a symbolic domain—
products of the human mind (languages, myths, stories,
scientific theories and mathematical constructions, songs,
paintings, and sculptures, etc.; i.e., Popper’s World 3) as well
as the world of mental and psychological states (Popper’s
World 2).
How does an information artist go about acquiring
knowledge about the world (Popper’s World 3)? Like an in-
formation scientist, who is not a subject expert, an informa-
tion artist acquires knowledge mostly from secondary and
tertiary sources, and rarely from primary sources. This is
one of the parallels between an information scientist and
artist. The other similarity is that an information scientist,
like an information artist, extracts information/knowledge
from documents or other sources of knowledge; however,
unlike an artist who constructs blocks of sensations, an in-
formation scientist constructs databases, abstracts, indexes,
knowledge-maps, atlases of science, and other representa-
tions or secondary sources of information or knowledge.
This is, of course, only a partial list of what information
scientists do.
Hakken (2003) suggested that there are two opposing
views of the data–information–knowledge trichotomy,
which he dubbed as the modernist knowledge progression
and the postmodernist knowledge regression. The modernist
progression starts with data, which are conceived as raw and
directly apprehensible. Data arranged or manipulated in
certain ways are information. In Soft Systems thinking
(Checkland, 1990), for instance, information is data plus
meaning. In the modernist account, further manipulation of
information according to certain procedures, such as “verifi-
cation,” results in knowledge (Hakken, 2003). In this view,
which reflects the empiricist philosophy, the social, political,
and other contexts are ignored, and therefore the progression
from data to knowledge is unproblematic. The alternative
postmodernist account starts with knowledge. Knowledge is
seen as contextual and embodied in actual people and situa-
tions. The production of information is seen as decontextu-
alizing or desituating knowledge, cutting it of important
context. Abstracting knowledge from its context(s) is not a
natural or an unproblematic process. Hence, information is
inherently contrived. Data are further abstracted (deterritori-
alized) or “denatured” information (Hakken, 2003).
From the postmodernist perspective, documents can be
seen as representations of knowledge. They do not contain
knowledge as such since knowledge is embodied in situations
and people. Documents contain traces or reflections of knowl-
edge. They are part of a knowledge environment constituted
by people, practices, situations, and other artifacts. A docu-
ment on its own is therefore a deterritorialized representation
of knowledge. From this perspective, Karamuftuoglu (1997)
saw document retrieval as a process of further deterritorial-
ization followed by reterritorialization. In this view, retrieval
systems decontextualize/deterritorialize both documents and
user queries further by dividing them into atomic units of key-
words removed from their original contexts. This is followed
15For a theory of perception, which is a direct source of inspiration for
Deleuze and Guattari (1994), see Bergson’s (1896/1911) Matter and Memory.
16Perception is always embodied, situated, and concrete; it involves a
body and knowledge of the external world. Bergson (1896/1911) stated
that: “It expresses and measures the power of action [italics added] in the
living being, the indetermination of the movement, which will follow the
receipt of the stimulus” (p. 68). 
17Popper (1972).
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by a matching operation, where the decontextualized key-
words from queries are conjoined with similarly decontextu-
alized keywords taken from documents. This is seen as a
context control, or reterritorialization, operation.
From this perspective, creation of indexes and other sec-
ondary sources such as thesauri and knowledge maps can be
seen as a process of abstracting information from primary
sources (e.g., research documents). Hence, one of the main
functions of an information scientist is the creation of de-
contextualized knowledge; that is, information. An informa-
tion scientist, like the artist, works with knowledge, ab-
stracting from it and constructing new knowledge and
information18 from that abstraction in the form of thesauri,
knowledge maps, indexes, abstracts, and so on; that is, rela-
tively deterritorializing and reterritorializing knowledge.
Similar to the information artist, an information scientist
works in a symbolic domain of language, scientific theories,
and conjectures, literature (fiction), musical information
(e.g., notation), photographs, paintings, and other art. Note
that reterritorialization or recontextualization always implies
construction of a new context. A term reterritorialized, for
instance, in a database or a thesaurus, does not have the lim-
ited meaning it has in a particular document. Similarly, it
does not carry all the senses it has ever been put in use in dif-
ferent texts. From a structuralist point of view of language
(Saussure, 1974), it can be said that a term in an index or the-
saurus enters relationships with all the other terms in that
representation scheme, directly or indirectly, and acquires its
meanings from its associations with them. Some of these
senses may be found in the published documents, and some
may not yet exist (i.e., exist only potentially, waiting to be
actualized in a document). On the other hand, not all senses
in which it is used are likely to be captured by the thesaurus
or the index.
Conclusions
We have seen that works of information art could be ana-
lyzed and evaluated in terms of paradigms (theories and
meta-theories) and their epistemological, ontological, and
methodological assumptions. A similar approach to subject
analysis is proposed by Hjørland (1992, 1997a, 2002).
Therefore, it can be suggested that the sociocognitive view
developed by Hjørland is useful for both purposes, and
hence can be seen as a unifying framework for the fields of
information arts and information science. It was argued
earlier in this article that information scientists and artists
work in similar ways on three counts:
• They create new knowledge and information by abstracting
from documents and other sources; that is, deterritorializing
and reterritorializing knowledge.
• They work mainly in a symbolic domain, and not directly
with the physical world19 in the process of acquisition and
production of knowledge.
• They are not subject experts; hence, more often than not,
they acquire knowledge from secondary and tertiary sources.
The first point is important and needs emphasis. Any sci-
ence, or more generally, disciplined inquiry, creates new
knowledge. In the case of information science, creation of
new knowledge does not just mean invention of a new
method of classification (e.g., faceted classification), or a
search algorithm, or an approach to subject analysis, and so
on. It means, more generally, production of knowledge about
the world or reality through creation of secondary informa-
tion sources (e.g., databases, indexes, thesauri, ontologies,
knowledge maps, etc.) that organize the concepts (created by
other sciences) through which we comprehend the world. In-
formation scientists do not passively represent knowledge or
transfer information from one source to another. Indexes,
ontologies, databases, and other representations and sources
they create make it possible for us to see new connections
between concepts, and thus understand the world in new
ways. The work of Swanson (1987, 1989) can be seen as an
explicit attempt to create new knowledge by exploring logi-
cal connections between terms and concepts indexed in
databases. The relational indexing scheme invented by
Farradane (1970) also is based on a similar idea. However,
the argument here is that knowledge creation in information
science is not limited these and similar examples. The arti-
facts that information scientists create—in particular, the
secondary sources of information—organize and transform
our knowledge of the world by making certain connections
between concepts and terms visible and inadvertently mak-
ing others invisible. From this perspective, information
science is seen as a critical science or discipline.
The critical role of artists is better understood and appre-
ciated. Wilson (1993), for instance, wrote that:
Critical theory and cultural studies are a powerful methodol-
ogy. Their perspectives are being fruitfully employed in a
wide array of disciplines, including anthropology, psychia-
try, politics, literature, art, media studies, and philosophy.
The analyses are robust, and revolutionize the understanding
of things often taken for granted.
Epistemological analyses of this sort have been fruitful when
applied to the art world because it is a culture industry rela-
tively unselfconscious about the metanarratives it assumes
and the limited sets of interests it has represented.
18Knowledge is not a thing, as argued from the postmodernist knowl-
edge regression position. Hence, when it is referred here and in the rest of
the article to knowledge creation, it is meant the construction or creation of
artifacts that are used in knowledge production processes in concrete con-
texts. Similarly, we use the term information to refer to artifacts used in
knowledge production processes, which are relatively more decontextual-
ized (deterritorialized) in comparison to knowledge artifacts. Therefore, the
difference between knowledge and information artifacts, or knowledge and
information in short, is a matter of degree of deterritorialization.
19Although information artists sometimes conduct experiments to
acquire information/knowledge directly.
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It is hoped that the present work would contribute to the
understanding and appreciation of information science as a
critical discipline and that the parallels drawn here between
information science and information arts make possible
unification of education in both fields. It is argued that in-
formation artists require some of the skills and knowledge
of information scientists. These include, but are not limited
to, knowledge about sources of information, ability to find
and acquire relevant information, and learn about basic
concepts in disciplines in which they do not have training.
There also is a strong need for basic education in philoso-
phy, especially philosophy of science and epistemology, in
both fields. Thus, students in both fields could be educated
in a common set of skills and subjects. Although, the
discussion in this article is focused on scientific and techni-
cal information, it can be extended to other types of
knowledge.
Finally, it might be useful to comment briefly on the
label of information science. It has been suggested by a
number of researchers (e.g., Capurro & Hjørland, 2003;
Hjørland, 2000) that the lack of clarity of its epistemolog-
ical base makes the term information unsuitable as a label
in describing the kind of activities carried out under infor-
mation science. It is not possible here to discuss all the
issues that surround the choice of a name for this field;
however, it can be argued that the ambiguity of the con-
cept of information makes it, on the contrary, potentially a
good label. It is arguable that information science at its
present state of development is a multidisciplinary field. In
this respect, it might be more accurate to talk about infor-
mation sciences in plural. According to Besselaar and
Heimeriks (2001), multidisciplinary research uses different
theoretical perspectives borrowed from various disciplines,
however neither the theoretical perspectives, nor the find-
ings of various disciplines are highly integrated. Interdisci-
plinary and transdisciplinary fields display a more coher-
ent identity and integrated theoretical and methodological
orientation.
The view that information science is a multidisciplinary
field may seem odd. Many people think of information sci-
ence as an interdisciplinary subject with a relatively estab-
lished theoretical and methodological identity; however,
the view here is that information science is an emerging
discipline that studies production, storage, retrieval, com-
munication, and use of information/knowledge in society.
This view incorporates social and cultural as well as sci-
entific and technological aspects of production, dissemina-
tion and use of information, and mechanisms of achieving
this by computational and other means. Many disciplines
have felt in the last few decades the need to address ques-
tions or face problems that do not fit in their disciplinary
boundaries but are relevant to the broad domain of infor-
mation science defined as the study of production, dissem-
ination, and use of information in society. Social sciences,
philosophy, linguistics and semiotics, computer science,
library science and documentation, psychology, cognitive
science, ergonomics, communication studies, economics,
art, and management/ business studies as well as a number
of “hard” sciences such as chemistry and biology have felt
such a need. As a response to this need, many traditional
disciplines appended information-related labels to their
names: Computer and information sciences, library and in-
formation science, social/organizational/business informat-
ics, bioinformatics, management information systems, and
information arts are a few examples of such attempts of
broadening disciplinary boundaries. Arguably, the emer-
gence of the discipline of information science can be seen
as a similar attempt of cross-disciplinary integration of
research issues that cannot be addressed from a single
disciplinary perspective. The view in this article is that
information science is an emerging critical science that
studies information-related phenomena at different levels,
including the societal; therefore, it is important not to tie
information science to a single or particular disciplinary
lineage.
“Social informatics” is another label more recently pro-
posed,20 which puts forward a similar research program.
Information science is used as the preferred name here,
but there is no fundamental philosophical reason for not
using social informatics or any other information-related
label. None of the disciplines mentioned earlier offers a
sufficiently developed critical framework or broad enough
scope that could adequately deal with many facets of pro-
duction, communication, and use of information in society
by computational and other means. The ambiguity of the
concept of information helps avoid identification with a
single disciplinary ancestry. This is desirable because it
helps avoid premature definition and closure of the disci-
plinary boundaries of this developing field, and keeps
open the possibility of integration of related but diverse
research agendas. It must be acknowledged that the term
information has been associated with positivistic connota-
tions in the past, but as it is discussed in this article to an
extent, this has been recently challenged by various criti-
cal approaches and different theoretical perspectives. It is
not possible to predict at this stage how the process of de-
limitation of disciplinary boundaries of information sci-
ence will develop and at what stage the growth of its
scope will stop; however, it is important to avoid superfi-
cial unification of different disciplinary research issues by
aiming integration at a deeper epistemological and
methodological level. It is hoped that information sci-
ence(s) will eventually develop from its present state of a
multidisciplinary field into a more coherent discipline
with a consistent epistemological and methodological
base, and the present article is a contribution to efforts in
that direction.
20See, for instance, the special issue of the Journal of the American
Society for Information Science on social informatics (Kling, Rosenbaum,
& Hert, 1998).
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